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Theories on corporate governance have developed in line with the development of the finan-
cial markets and the increasing power of institutional investors. Indeed, the financial mar-
kets’ power can be measured by the ability of shareholders, and of institutional investors in
particular, to influence businesses and their managers. A number of reforms have been
implemented in several countries, Switzerland included, in order to strengthen shareholders’
powers. Making specific reference to Swiss case studies, this paper aims to create a better
understanding of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Indeed, Swit-
zerland is paradoxical in that it is generally considered Rhenish, with banks and families
taking a leading role in controlling big business (David et al. 2004; Windolf & Nollert
2001), whilst developing a pension fund system which, since the mid-1980s, has attracted
considerable funds and is still experiencing strong growth. How do these two
approaches, traditionally at opposite ends of the spectrum as far as the subject’s literature is
concerned, reconcile themselves in the Swiss market?
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Introduction
Theories on corporate governance have developed in line with the development of the finan-
cial markets and the increasing power of institutional investors. Indeed, the financial
markets’ power can be measured by the ability of shareholders, and of institutional inves-
tors in particular, to influence businesses and their managers. A number of reforms have
been implemented in several countries, Switzerland included, in order to strengthen
shareholders’ powers.
These changes have reconfigured traditional models of capitalism, particularly in
continental Europe. Let us not forget that the financial markets play a central role in the
Anglo-Saxon model and institutional investors have a privileged place within it, with the
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businesses effectively being controlled externally and with the primary aim of creating
wealth for the shareholders. In contrast, financial markets play traditionally a less influ-
ential role in Continental Europe. In the Rhenish model, banks are central to financial
governance as much through their direct involvement in controlling businesses as through
their financial service provision, whilst financial markets are still underdeveloped in
comparison with Anglo-Saxon countries. Nevertheless, with financial globalisation and the
strong development of market finance in most countries, the specificities of the financial
structures developed up to now in the countries of mainland Europe seem to be becoming
less marked. Therefore, and for some (e.g. Morin 2000), the traditional distinctions between
Anglo-Saxon and other models are at the same time apparently becoming obsolete: the
Anglo-Saxon model appears to be taking over as the standard framework model, imposing
its ‘structural forms’ across the board, not just in terms of intermediation but also in terms
of control. Others (e.g. Giraud 2001) observe that the Anglo-Saxon model is also undergo-
ing transformation. Neither model is going to stop transforming and they are already
converging towards ‘something else’.
In all cases, alignment on the Anglo-Saxon model, with more or less resistance, or
hybridisation of models, changes and reforms are today reconfiguring capitalism(s) and
both institutional investors and pension funds are often said to play a key role in these
changes. Highly active, they are in a position to impose new standards and regulations
which favour the shareholder and ultimately put considerable pressure on company direc-
tors and business strategy (Lordon 2000; Morin 1998, 2000; Orléan 1999). Some see these
investors as leading capitalism to a new stage of development (Clark & Hebb 2004). Others
consider institutional investors to be taking a very passive role (Clearfield 2004), with few in
a position to make their voices heard (Aglietta & Rebérioux 2004) and with little power to
implement original policy (Engelen 2003).
Making specific reference to Swiss case studies, this paper aims to create a better under-
standing of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. Indeed, Switzerland
is paradoxical in that it is generally considered Rhenish, with banks and families taking a
leading role in controlling big business (David et al. 2004; Windolf & Nollert 2001), whilst
developing a pension fund system which, since the mid-1980s, has attracted considerable
funds and is still experiencing strong growth. How do these two approaches, traditionally at
opposite ends of the spectrum as far as the subject’s literature is concerned, reconcile them-
selves in the Swiss market? Moreover, if Swiss pension funds manage an important and
increasing amount of money and are consequently an emergent category of financial actors,
are they to be considered as all-powerful and autonomous players and shareholders? Up to
which point are they leading the move in Switzerland? Or are they just to be considered as a
new but passive financial layer?
We posit that the financial market, which is concentrated around the Zurich area, and
to a lesser extent around Geneva, has not abdicated control to the pension funds. The
explanation which we propose for this draws on work by Martin and Minns (1995) and by
Clark (2000, 2003), who follow the course taken by funds selected by pension funds, and
show how the financial markets, precisely because they are based in London, retain power
over the whole system. More specifically we will show how the financial system creates a
number of intermediaries between the funds and the recipient companies and how the
system makes investments opaque in the eyes of the eventual shareholders. It would
seem that Swiss pension funds are subject to the disadvantages of both systems: of the
Anglo-Saxon system in terms of risk bearing and of the Rhenish system in that they do not
have the power to influence the way companies are managed.
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In order to delineate the relationships between Swiss pension funds and the finance
industry as well as the corporate engagement of pension funds, this paper draws on previous
empirical research aimed at identifying the investment channels used by Swiss pension funds
(Theurillat et al. 2006a). The first section looks at research into models of capitalism, the
role and power of institutional investors as well as the organisation of the financial industry,
its networks and its centres. The second section shows the unique way in which the Swiss
system has developed within this context.
The Financial Markets, Forms of Intermediation and Control and Territory
The primacy of the financial markets is one of the defining characteristics of our age. We
will give a brief overview of contemporary views on financial systems and governance.
Firstly, we will introduce the two stylised models of capitalism with distinct financial struc-
tures, i.e. the Rhenish model and the Anglo-Saxon model. If, until the 1980s, different types/
models of capitalism seemed to coexist, the promotion and development of the financial
markets seem to irrevocably affect all contemporary economies and challenge the Rhenish
model. We also wish to examine some of the factors underlying these changes as well as the
future of banking in this environment. Secondly, we will briefly return to the issue of corpo-
rate governance, as the boom in institutional investment is undoubtedly at the root of
the resurgence in shareholder power. Finally, we shall attempt to define the spatial
consequences of the previously described transformations.
Stylised Models of Capitalism, Intermediation and Forms of Control
Within literature on the subject, traditionally two stylised models of capitalism1 with distinct
financial structures, and particularly those with different forms of intermediation and
control, have tended to be placed in direct opposition to each other (Orléan 1999).
The first, the Rhenish model, epitomised by Germany, has a number of defining
characteristics, such as a concentration of capital, giving the main shareholders internal
control, particularly within large banks. Such banks play a key role as, given these
companies are often major shareholders, they on the one hand provide them with credit, and
on the other get involved in managing and overseeing them. If there is little transparency in
this system, it nevertheless brings considerable organisational stability and encourages
close, long-term relationships between the banks and industry. The banks attain their
position through a power balance, which is built on plentiful and confidential information,
as well as on regular, long-term bilateral relations. Ownership of capital is stabilised through
retaining shares in one’s own company and having reciprocal shareholdings. The financial
markets are underdeveloped and liquidity plays only a marginal role. This is known as
‘locked’ capitalism and hostile takeover bids are infrequent. In short, in this model the
banks are at the centre of financial governance.
The second, the Anglo-Saxon model, as epitomised by the United States and the United
Kingdom, is configured differently: here, the financial markets are highly developed and
liquid, with widely disseminated minority shareholders, making direct company control
very difficult and, moreover, very costly. Shareholders are therefore unable to exercise
direct, ex-ante control over management, but put pressure on the managers by threatening
to withdraw their capital (defection). This is effectively ‘distant’, ex post control, as far as
business results are concerned, but there is no direct involvement in company management
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(Paillard & Amable 2000). In this second model, hostile takeovers are frequent and the
financial markets play a vital role, both in terms of financing and control. In such cases,
bank intermediation, and the banks themselves, play a minor role, as it is the markets that
are at the heart of financial governance.
In a climate of financial globalisation and with the financial markets developing vigor-
ously right around the globe, the individual character of the financial structures hitherto
developed in continental Europe seem to be being weakened. Some see this heralding the
end of alternative models as they are brought in line with the Anglo-Saxon model (e.g.
Morin 2000). Others, such as Giraud (2001), see the Anglo-Saxon model itself evolving,
with different models also undergoing constant change, already converging into ‘something
else’. Thus, there may not simply be a one-sided convergence of the financial systems but
rather reconstitutions, which give rise to hybrid, often original forms (Saïdane 2005) or new
amalgams (Crouch 2005). We wish to contribute to this debate by tracing the specific
trajectory of the Swiss model without necessarily delivering any definitive judgements upon
it. At a very general level we can, however, see that on the one hand reforms made in many
countries, including Switzerland, are directly inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model, and on
the other hand the increasing power of institutional investors and some reforms favouring
the free movement of capital have more or less successfully (depending on the country)
transformed the economic landscape of continental Europe.
Institutional investors and the move towards the free circulation of capital. How can we
explain the increase in the financial markets’ power in contemporary societies? There are
two issues which we think are worth examining. Firstly, the increasing power of collective
investment schemes and the concentration of them in the hands of institutional investors
(Clark 2000, 2003; Montagne 2006) and, secondly, those political and institutional reforms
aimed at promoting mobility/liquidity of capital (Corpataux & Crevoisier 2005a).
The increasing power of collective investment schemes and the concentration of these in
the hands of institutional investors have played an important role in the transformations
which are affecting the financial system. Indeed, even if there are increasing numbers of
households investing either directly or indirectly in shares, it is primarily the financial inter-
mediaries who manage these funds (banks, insurance firms and pension funds all fall under
the rubric of institutional investors) and thus who seem to actually control them. In the US,
since the late 1970s institutional investors appear to have become the key financial players
and have come to manage the majority of financial assets (Giraud 2001; Orléan 2000). These
investors are now mainly placing their fund investments in the financial markets. The
development of these new actors pushed the financial industry to expand over the last years.
As an emergent category of financial actors, clearly part of the contemporary financial
system, institutional investors have been at the same time important vehicles for change in
the financial markets. Of these, pension funds particularly stand out (Boubel & Pansard
2004; Giraud 2001; Plihon 2004).
Two types of institutional reforms have been introduced in most countries in order to
create and support the development of the financial markets at both national and
international level, i.e. internal and external liberalisation (Morin 2006). On the one hand,
reforms aim to remove all regulatory obstacles to the free and absolute movement of capital.
So, we have seen the UK’s removal of exchange controls in 1979, the partial opening up of
Japan’s financial markets in 1983–84, the unimpeded movement of capital in Europe as
dictated by the Single European Act (Bourguinat 2000); all of these measures are aimed at
encouraging the spatial omobility of capital. On the other hand, there are reforms that aim
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to improve the operational and informational efficiency of the financial markets, i.e. which
aim to promote their liquidity and transparency as well as guaranteeing good quality public
information. This is what we call the increase in capital mobility/liquidity (Corpataux &
Crevoisier 2005a), since the liberalisation of the movement of capital goes hand-in-hand
with the development of the financial markets and their liquidity.
According to writers (Aglietta 1998; Boyer 2000; Chesnais 2001; Lordon 2000; Orléan
1999) close to, or affiliated with the Ecole de la Régulation, an accumulation regime based
on finance (defined as the ‘financialised accumulation regime’), apparently succeeds the
techno-industrial regime based on mass production and consumption (the Fordist regime).
In the Fordist regime, finance was subordinated to productive industrial capital and it took
largely the form of bank credit. Finance was strongly ‘contained’ through different types of
regulation. Competition between banks was not as centre stage as today. Economic policies
were based on ‘cheap’ money, while banking institutions did not implement high profile
policies of market segmentation between the various actors. In such a context, securing
bank credit was relatively straightforward and available to most businesses. Finance is now
increasingly acting as an autonomous force, imposing increasingly high financial profita-
bility criteria (Morin 2006), whereas forms of finance are becoming more and more hetero-
geneous and are increasingly offered via the financial markets. The privatization wave in
Europe of state-controlled companies in the 1990s allowed the listing of these companies on
the stock markets and the growth of the latter. The finance industry expanded into new
sectors of activity, such as property markets (Theurillat et al. 2006b) or urban infrastruc-
tures (Torrance 2006) too. Today, finance, the current dominant institutional form, can be
seen as controlling the forms and the pace of accumulation. Thus, according to Orléan
(1999: 214), ‘contemporary economies are mainly characterised by having taken financial
power to previously unattained levels and having put this power at the very centre of their
accumulation regime.’
This movement towards an economy which is governed by the financial markets raises
a number of questions. Firstly, there is the crucial issue of the future of banking: the banks
seem to have a less influential role in capitalist systems dominated by the financial markets.
Indeed, where some pundits see the end of traditional banking intermediation, others
believe that the role of banks is simply evolving or continuously in reinvention (Erturk &
Solari 2007). In brief, if pension funds add a layer to the existing financial structure, some
consider that the institutionalisation of savings has often led to the erosion of other institu-
tions which provide financial intermediation services, not least of which are the banks.
Others observe that one of the new roles of banks makes them ‘money managers’ for others
and especially for pension funds when these last actors choose not to undertake all the
management in-house.
Institutional investors and changes to the financial circuits. In common with
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK, US and Canada, and with the Netherlands in con-
tinental Europe, Switzerland is an economy in which pension funds manage a considerable
portion of household savings. They constitute a burgeoning group within finance. Up until
the 1980s the collection and distribution of household savings was a service almost exclu-
sively provided by the banks; pension funds are now making significant inroads into this
area (Aglietta 2001). Banks collected savings locally and reinvested the greater part of it in
their own region in the form of banking credit, mortgages, etc. Pension funds are now
attracting a large proportion of these savings and are generally investing this money directly
in the financial markets. By diverting these savings, the pension funds are competing with
the banks on what used to be their own turf.
1 2 3
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The increasing importance of pension funds is pushing to the transformation and
spatial reconfiguration of financial channels (Theurillat et al. 2007). When we consider the
huge amount of household savings they attract, we should also examine how the big players
divide up the financial intermediary services between them: are the banks being ousted
(Boubel & Pansard 2004; Saïdane 2005)? Indeed, if some commentators herald this as the
era of disintermediation, (i.e. the complete disappearance of financial intermediaries,
leaving only the option of direct relations with those who supply and demand capital),
others such as French and Leyshon (2004) insist that there is no such thing
as disintermediation, but that we are simply seeing the emergence of new forms of
intermediation, a process which they term reintermediation.
With this case in point, the banks are not necessarily disappearing, and are far from
losing interest in the development of the financial markets. Their traditional intermediary
role (collecting savings deposits, allocating credit) is simply being diminished and trans-
formed. Indeed, some of them are increasingly abandoning their traditional role as credit
providers to offer other financial services. They have even started to emphasise their activi-
ties on the financial markets by helping businesses and individuals to acquire securities
(shares, bonds, negotiable debt instruments, etc.), or even by issuing shares on the money
and financial markets. Morin (2006) has shown how, for example at international level,
banks are not disappearing, quite the opposite in fact: those with the greatest power and
presence are forming an oligopoly. In such a perspective banks have reinveinted themselves
so that they increasingly depend on new activities, generally indexed by the rise of fee
income (Erturk & Solari 2007).
In this new context, what shareholder power do institutional investors, particularly
pension funds, actually wield? Have they now become active, all-powerful shareholders?
Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors’ Activism
According to some, we are entering an age of shareholder capitalism. New relationships are
springing up between shareholders and company managers. Reforms have been imple-
mented to ensure a shareholder value model, in which the shareholders alone have control.
In such set-ups, the investors apparently rule the roost: holding a substantial proportion of
the shares, they can impose upon a business their own rules regarding management and
profit margins, even whilst remaining minority shareholders.
From managerial capitalism to shareholder capitalism? In the US, Berle and Means
(1932) observed that in the first half of the twentieth century, a growing number of firms fell
under managerial control. At the time, business managers were dealing with a loose
conglomeration of individual shareholders who were often isolated and scattered far and
wide. Managers were therefore ‘all-powerful’ and their power rarely contested. In this
context, this could be called managerial capitalism. Today, institutional investors hold a
growing share of the capital of many businesses and seem to call managerial power into
question. This concentration of capital and decision-making power in the hands of insti-
tutional investors – supposedly organised and professional fund managers – changes the
set-up considerably (Boubel & Pansard 2004; Harmes 1998). Fund managers seem to be
able to bring some power to bear upon company management, or at the very least, closely
scrutinise the decisions that management make. Some have labelled this new configuration
shareholder or ‘patrimonial’ capitalism (Orléan 2000; Plihon 2004).
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Thus, if the financial markets are developing partly in response to the growth of insti-
tutional investor power, these same institutional investors are using the financial markets
and their liquidity for their own ends. Their aim is perfectly straightforward: to increase
shareholder wealth by pushing shares to their maximum price and increasing dividends
(Orléan 1999). This is generally referred to as ‘creating shareholder value’. Adding share-
holder value usually also involves instituting a new form of corporate governance. This aims
simply to reduce asymmetric information between shareholders and managers and to bring
the interests of the latter in line with those of the former (Lordon 2000). Of course, since
Jensen and Meckling’s pioneering work (1976), a whole area of financial theory has been
devoted to conceptualising possible relationships between managers and shareholders in
terms of agency theory and in promoting the interests of shareholders. The latter provides
the normative principles which favour shareholders and lead in particular to current corpo-
rate governance reforms These principles specifically cover transparency of information to
shareholders, the obligation for managers to be accountable to shareholders as well as to
respect the rights of minority shareholders (Plihon 2004).
In the USA, institutional investor activism took root in the 1980s, when, for example,
public pension funds and union funds started submitting shareholder proposals to
companies (Gillan & Starks 2003). In France, for example, with the arrival of institutional
investors in the capital, the traditional management and capital-holding model has under-
gone a radical transformation. Morin and Rigamonti (2002) have also shown that the share-
holder structure has changed considerably over the last decade, while new management
practices that favour shareholders have started to emerge. These are having an impact on
companies’ operational management and strategic goals (Morin 1998). At the same time,
these changes, in terms of shareholder structure and new management practices, are
strongly related to the new importance of foreign investors – mainly Anglo-Saxon insti-
tutional investors – holding increasingly large quantities of share capital in French listed
companies. Indeed, let’s observe that shareholders’ activism, even in foreign equity
investments, seems to be an American phenomenon and mostly associated with a small
number of large mutual funds such as Fidelity or public pension funds such as CalPERS
(Golding 2003). Towards the end of the 1990s, Jeffers and Plihon (2002) estimated that this
share in foreign hands had reached 50 per cent of all companies on the CAC 40 Index.
Germany, on the other hand, seems less affected: changes to its financial system and the
relationships between the financial system and big business seem less profound, more super-
ficial. The Rhenish model seems to endure and undergo mainly incremental transformations
(Hackethal et al. 2005, 2006; O’Sullivan 2003). In Germany, from the point of view of the
control of listed companies, integration has still not occurred at either a national or inter-
national level, at least had not by the late 1990s. Indeed, the German financial marketr-
emains highly regionalised. Geographic and organisational concentrations remain
undiminished and the main shareholders are still largely from the same Land as the listed
company (Wojcik 2002).
Voice or exit? In an environment which increasingly favours the shareholder, we should
not lose sight of the fact that when shareholders are dissatisfied with their investment in a
company, they have two choices: they either sell their shares (what Hirschman (1970) called
the ‘exit strategy’), or they encourage the company to change its strategy, by exercising the
voting rights which their shares confer (the voice strategy). The latter activity is called
shareholder activism.
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Various writers have examined this issue and have come to different conclusions.
According to Clark and Hebb (2004), institutional investors and pension funds, even as
minority shareholders, re-aggregate hitherto disparate ownership rights to form a new
power coalition with sufficient weight to influence company management. These parties,
however, have little power in terms of exit strategy. Indeed, on the one hand, pension funds
tend more and more towards index-tracking, passive fund management, which leaves them
little room for manoeuvre. On the other hand, a mass exit could lead to the collapse of a
company’s stock market value, which is not in the funds’ interests. Clark and Hebb maintain
that this environment does not favour exit strategies and pension funds would rather utilise
the voice strategy.
For Aglietta and Rebérioux (2004), however, such a system does little to encourage
shareholder activism. If the development of the shareholder value principle increases the
dissociation between the ownership and the control of a company, it pushes shareholders to
adopt an exit rather than a voice strategy. According to these two authors, shareholders are
now tending to abandon their right to control businesses in favour of the advantages of
liquidity, i.e. the possibility of divesting oneself of one’s shares on the stock market at any
point.
The theories introduced so far are considered to be essential reading for anyone want-
ing to understand contemporary economic thinking, whether in a descriptive, prescriptive
or even performative form (Callon 2007), as these theories do not simply describe the situ-
ation or provide working principles for some players (from a pre-existing immutable and
objective reality), but are actually shaping and building this reality. Nevertheless, for the
most part they remain based on nation-state boundaries and use a ‘methodological
nationalism’ (Lévy 2007; Peck & Theodore 2007) where each nation-state is considered as a
single point. National frontiers are therefore ‘naturalized’ (Lipietz 1977) without question-
ing their real relevance and any sub-national variations, differences or differentiations are
neglected. Standard neoclassical theory looks for universal laws or theories that are valid at
every time and everywhere and thus fails to place the players in their geographic context and
do not take account of the networks of specific relationships in which they operate. More
institutionalist views such as those developed by the French Regulation School or the
Varieties of Capitalism stream are more sensitive to geographic or context-specific
variations, even if they still remain mainly based on nation-state boundaries in most of their
comparative works. In fact, the transformations that the financial system is currently
undergoing have come from very specific spaces or sub-national places. In return, these
same places are redrawing the geography of contemporary economies.
Reconfiguring the Financial Systems, Power and Regions
There are few theories which link finance and regional development, and those that do were
generally developed in the 1990s (see Corpataux & Crevoisier 2005a; or particularly
Corpataux (2003) for a more complete review).
With the emergence of global cities, Sassen (1991) argues that as financial activities
have developed they have started to cluster in certain areas. These ‘global cities’ should no
longer be seen as straightforward regional capitals: they are becoming the ‘command
centres’ of the world economy, from which multinational companies and international
financial markets are run, and which are hothouses for financial innovation. This process of
centralisation and spatial concentration of the financial system calls into question, at the
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other end of the scale, the development and autonomy of local banking structures (Dow
1999) and, ultimately, the development of non-central regions, and specifically the SMEs
(small and medium-sized enterprises) in these regions, who are largely dependent on
the regional financial circuits and on bank credit. In point of fact, the absence or gradual
disappearance of traditional financial circuits in these regions leads sooner or later to burge
goning SMEs being bought up by big businesses, often from outside the region. As a result,
regional decision-making powers and consequently centres of accumulation are lost
(Crevoisier 1997).
In short, financial power is being concentrated in these global cities, which work more
as part of a network, and which at the same time are cutting themselves off from their
hinterland. Furthermore, innovations in the financial sector (securitisation, the emergence
of new financial products and practices, etc.), the free movement of capital at national and
international level and the ability of financial centres to transform businesses’ real assets
into negotiable liquid securities on the stock markets have led to both a dissociation from
the sites of investment and given the centre an ability/power of spatial trade-off (Leyshon &
Thrift 1997) between the regional, national and international.
If the increasing power of institutional investors is now undeniable, to the extent that
some writers are now talking about a fifth stage of capitalism to describe this new
aggregated form of shareholder power (Clark & Hebb 2004), this new configuration can
lead to a spatial concentration of financial power. Martin and Minns (1995) have shown for
example that British pension funds are managed in a highly centralised way, by financial
institutions based mainly in the south-east. Functional and spatial concentration often go
hand-in-hand. Now, although a number of works are certainly taking the role of territory in
corporate governance into account (Bouba-Olga 2006; Clark & Wojcik 2007), their primary
focus is on shareholder profiles within (regional or international) listed companies. Such
works are not looking at the ‘structure’ of the field within its context, i.e. the diversity of
players within it, the ways and places in which they interact, and so on.2 Our view is that
these elements will now have a considerable bearing on the extent to which the shareholders
can use their power.
Switzerland: A Paradoxal Model
Since the late 1980s, Swiss capitalism, which used to resemble the Rhenish model, has under-
gone a number of significant transformations. Reforms such as decartelisation will encour-
age the restructuring of the financial system. Such financial activities are coalescing in the
country’s main financial centres, augmenting their decision-making powers and hastening
the decline of regional financial channels. Yet the pension funds are somewhat implicated in
these transformations. Throughout the 1990s their power increased, in an environment that
was increasingly favourable for corporate governance. Has the way been paved for them to
fall into this rather privileged position?
Methodology
The evidence used in this paper was collected during a previous research on the geographical
and functional channels used by the assets of Swiss pension funds (Theurillat et al. 2006a).
At that time, data were collected from both the (Swiss) Federal Statistics Office (OFS)
between 1992 and 2004, and from privately collected information on Swiss institutional
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investors (Lusenti et al.’s surveys between 1997 and 2005). In addition to this were some 20
semi-directive interviews, which were conducted with industry players in 2005.
Furthermore, a panel of 13 experts gathered on two occasions: they met in December 2004
in order to validate the hypotheses and identify relevant sources of information and respon-
dents; and in December 2005 to critically revisit the research results and to conclude the
study.
This empirical research was not centred on corporate governance in Switzerland, but
on the identification of the channels, the institutions and the strategies followed by the
various players along the chain of investments of pension funds. At the end, it appeared that
corporate governance issues were striking and paradoxical. Therefore, this paper is a
derived but particularly relevant result of that empirical work. Consequently, on the base of
this material, we can only bring partial conclusions and identify open research questions (see
Conclusions).
Defining Characteristics of the Helvetic Model and Recent Changes To It
Up until the early 1990s, the Swiss model of holding and managing capital very much
resembled the Rhenish model. According to David et al. (2004), there were three defining
characteristics to the Swiss model: firstly, powers of control were highly concentrated and
shared amongst only a few shareholders;3 secondly, there were well-established, long-term
relationships between banking and industry; and thirdly, measures were taken to protect big
businesses from hostile and foreign takeovers. The Swiss model, following the Rhenish
example, therefore seems ‘locked’ in comparison with its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. There,
capital ownership is stabilised by an interplay of internal controls and cross-shareholdings,
with the banks playing a key role here both in terms of control and credit provision. In short,
the country has a more Rhenish ‘macro-institutional’ configuration, making it seem opaque
and lacking in transparency to foreign investors, the Anglo-Saxons in particular.
Moreover, a financial market with international significance (specialising principally in
international wealth management) peacefully co-existed with a banking system that is
highly cartelised and very much focused on its domestic market. Banking conventions,
particularly the existence of standard tariffs, suppressed competition and allowed a number
of regional organisations to develop. Alongside an international financial market concen-
trated in three cities (Zurich, Geneva and Lugano) was an internal banking system made up
of numerous cantonal and regional banks, as well as the big banks, which were still very
much decentralised at the time.
In the early 1990s, various reforms, such as decartelisation4 of the banking sector, led to
centralisation. The larger banks are buying up failing regional banks, local stock exchanges
have closed, financial operations coalesce towards Zurich and the country’s main banks are
becoming increasingly internationalised (Corpataux & Crevoisier 2005a, 2005b).
During the same period, when the second pillar came into force, an increase in the
power of Swiss pension funds was observed. Indeed, Swiss pension funds have continued to
grow from the mid-1980s into and beyond 2000. Since 1998 these savings have even
outstripped national GDP. For example, in 2000 and 2004, the total assets managed by
pension funds represented 118 and 108 per cent, respectively, of GDP (OFS). Throughout
the 1990s, the pension funds’ portfolio profile changed, and an ever-increasing proportion
of the money that they manage now passes through the financial markets. In fact, the
combined quantity of shares and bonds has regularly increased, going from 44 per cent of
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overall wealth in 1992 (113bn) to 64 per cent in 2000 (314bn) and to 63 per cent in 2004
(307bn). This has been to the detriment of less liquid assets such as direct property holdings
or investments with employers and mortgages.
From the year 2000 onward, important changes then affected the shareholding
environment. These changes have strengthened the shareholders’ position and make the
Swiss model more transparent. Thus a whole series of both legal measures (e.g. Article 49 al
2 of the OPP2, requiring funds to specify whether or not they are exercising their
shareholding rights (OFAS 2001b5)), and informal measures (the ‘Swiss Codes of Best Prac-
tice for Corporate governance’ for Economiesuisse as well as SWX Guidelines) have been
made (Economiesuisse 2002). Nevertheless, and even at Economie Suisse, the umbrella
organisation for the country’s big businesses, a stand has been made against certain Anglo-
Saxon principles. For example, the ‘one share, one vote’ principle is still not officially part of
the code.
Quite simply, Switzerland is undergoing a transformation from a cartelised and region-
ally-based system of banking finance to a national/international financial system in which
the financial markets are playing an increasingly influential role. The regional financial
channels are in decline and are today simply making way for national and especially global
channels. At the same time, decision-making powers are tending to be concentrated in the
country’s main financial centres whilst governance standards that favour shareholder capi-
talism seem to be being implemented. Yet in the mid-1990s, Guex and Pasquier-Dorthe
(1996) believed that it was the banks, particularly the larger banks, which were leading the
way in the financial markets and in innovations in Switzerland. Their study did not really
include pension funds. If an increasingly significant number of pension funds are moving
into the financial markets, what effects will this have on the country’s banks and on the
redistribution of shareholder power? To put it plainly, should we be considering funds as
new financial players in their own right?
Fund Passivity and the Structure of the Investment Industry
Even if corporate governance reforms tend to favour minority shareholders, and therefore
pension funds, are funds or indeed can funds really be active from a corporate governance
point of view in Switzerland, fulfilling the minimal requirement, i.e. the exercise of voting
rights or attendance of AGMs? Nevertheless, and despite recent reforms, funds do not seem
to be any more active (Lusenti 2003; Swissca 2004).6 A wide variety of reasons may explain
the passivity of Swiss pension funds, not least of which is the absence of a shareholder
culture in Switzerland (Oesch 2000; Wernli 2004). Yet, we would contend, the lack of any
activism on the part of Swiss pension funds might be explained by the structure and the
dynamic of the investment industry.
Small funds managed by non-professionals. For a start, the Swiss industry in particular
has really taken off. Indeed, the second pillar system is made up of some 2445 funds
registered in 2002, and, although they may be scattered across the territory as a whole, they
are mainly coalescing around the country’s main cities. Each one has its own investment
policy. However, they are very often managed by representatives of the employees and
employers who are not financial professionals. Their primary concern is ensuring that the
return on their funds covers their present or future guaranteed annuities. These individuals
not only determine the investment policy (the portfolio distribution of bonds, shares, real
estate, etc.), they also determine what is managed internally and what is outsourced. In
practice, almost all management is outsourced.
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Indeed, besides collective funds (93 in 2002), which are entirely managed by insurance
companies and banks,7 only a few large independent funds8 would have the means to employ
internal managers and train them in-house. So, where the Novartis fund, for example,
manages a large part of its securities in-house, Nestlé outsources. Nevertheless, interviews
and meetings conducted with branch experts confirm that, in Switzerland, pension funds,
even the large ones, generally look beyond their own company for the greater part of their
securities portfolio management.
Again, the law now tends to institutionalise delegation to third parties, to outside
experts. The revision of Article 50 of OPP2 allows for the ‘reformulation of the definition of
security’, and essentially states that, in principle, pension fund investment activities are their
own responsibility (OFAS 2000). Accordingly, the pension funds’ managing bodies (which
are for the most part made up of ordinary citizens) have to turn to specialists, i.e. financial
advisors and wealth managers, in order to meet their personal responsibilities. So what are
these financial institutions that look after securities for pension funds, and where are they
based?
The direct management of funds’ securities is therefore largely delegated to the finan-
cial institutions that are attached to the banks. The vast majority of funds turn to various
investment bodies for management mandates as well as for collective investments (Lusenti
2003; Robeco 2002; SFO several years).9
Now, despite the increase in mandates or collective investments, only a small number of
financial institutions covering this market exist. Indeed, in the case of management
mandates, which made up 80 per cent of investments in 2002, the market is divided between
private Swiss banks (30 per cent), the big banks (UBS and Crédit Suisse representing 28 per
cent) and cantonal banks (17 per cent). Foreign banks and financial institutions have only a
small share in the institutional management market (15 per cent) (Robeco 2002). When it
comes to collective investments, the situation is exactly the same: the big investment
companies and investment funds also belong to these players. All the wealth management
departments of these businesses, as well as the majority of investment companies, are based
in Zurich or Geneva.
Essentially, the country’s largest banks manage most of the assets. How does this
financial sector invest its funds? On what management principles does it operate?
The dispersal of shares and internationalisation. Funds are now significant shareholders:
their equity portfolios as a percentage of their total wealth jumped from 11 per cent (27.2bn)
in 1992 to 27 per cent (131.3bn) in 2004. This increase in equity holdings is as much due to
the increase in stock market rates as to new purchases. See Table 1.
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TABLE 1
Weight of pension funds on the Swiss Stock Exchange, 1992–2004 (in CHF millions)
 Swiss equity in funds SPI market capitalisation Weight of funds in the SPI (%)
1992 21’274 276’980 7.7
1994 29’809 372’586 8.0
1996 39’871 539’944 7.4
1998 63’828 946’615 6.7
2000 86’834 1’257’276 6.9
2002 51’214 737’999 6.9
2004 59’219 886’748 6.7
Sources: OFS (2000, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006) and SWX.12
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However, this considerable move towards equity has not translated into an increase in
the weight of pension funds on the Swiss Stock Exchange. In fact, their weight in the Swiss
Performance Index (SPI) diminished between 1992 and 2004, from 7.7 to 6.7 per cent. This
could be explained by the fact that investments are subject to an internationalisation
strategy.
Indeed, if we focus exclusively on pension funds’ equity portfolios, we can see that the
proportion of Swiss equity (of the total equity portfolio), declined by over 30 points between
1992 and 2004, from 77 per cent (21.3bn) to 45 per cent (59.2bn), whilst shares in foreign
equity rocketed from 23 per cent (6.4bn) in 1992 to 55 per cent (72.1bn) in 2004.
Taken globally, funds could be seen to have a certain influence. Nevertheless, taken
individually, even large funds do not have much influence amongst the colossi of the stock
market, which severely limits their powers of control and influence. For instance, if a fund
with a fortune of 10bn (in 2002, only 15 funds managed over 5bn) decided to invest 25 per
cent of its wealth in a single business such as Novartis, which was worth almost 143bn in
2002, it would still only have 1.7 per cent of voting rights. This is true for Switzerland’s ten
largest listed companies, as no fund held more than 5 per cent of their capital between 1998
and 2005 (SWX 2005). Can funds perhaps have more influence over small and midcaps
companies? In research into non-financial organisations in the SPI, Wernli (2004) found that
between 1998 and 2002, only 23 pension funds held a stake of over 5 per cent in secondary
securities on the SPI.10 Funds do not invest much in listed companies’ capital, probably
because most fund managers opt for a diversification strategy when structuring a large pro-
portion of their investments. This diversification principle, which applies to management
mandates as well as to securities, leads to multiple and highly disparate share purchases, the
latter being, ultimately, very low.
In fact, four big businesses (Novartis, Nestlé, Roche and UBS) account for just under
60 per cent of the SPI (Table 2)! Even so, and backed by the responsible principle of diversi-
fication and the number of external mandates, it is highly probable that Swiss pension funds
will ultimately find themselves shareholders of the same big businesses on the domestic
market. Any players with a strategy of Swiss market index-tracking should expect to find
that, of their equity investments in this market, at least 60 per cent of them are made up of
shares in the big four. . .
Finally, it is worth noting the increase in collective investments. These do not tend to
lead to fund activism (‘voice’), as shareholders’ rights generally fall to financial institutions
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TABLE 2
The four largest listed companies on the Swiss stock market in 2004 (in CHF millions)
2004 Total stock market value % shares in SPI
Novartis AG, Basel 152’999 17
Nestlé AG, Cham & Vevey 120’047 14
Roche Holding AG, Basel 115’965 13
UBS AG, Zurich 107’314 12
Total for 4 companies 496’326 56
SPI total 886’748 100
Source: SWX.
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(funds, foundations and investment companies).11 This is a crucial issue, given that, for both
international and domestic investments, the trend is towards collective shareholding (7.8 per
cent in 1992 and 23.4 per cent in 2004).
Swiss pension funds are unusually inactive due to a number of reasons, including the
small size of the funds, a workforce of non-professionals, ordinary citizens who prefer to
outsource, fragmentation of investments in company stock, etc. Moreover, we would also
go on to argue that the very dynamic of the finance industry does not help funds to take a
clear view of the situation. This also contributes to a further lack of activism on their part.
The dynamics of the finance industry: a matter of transparency and . . . opacity. Various,
often contradictory, forces are at work within the Swiss finance industry, which render it
opaque for certain players (Theurillat et al. 2007). Generally speaking, the finance industry
needs to be transparent in order that different asset classes can be assessed and compared to
determine relative risks and returns. Thus, using the information available, financiers can
compare an investment in a Russian mining company and a Swiss chemicals firm, and an
investment fund which has a mix of bonds and equity with a real estate fund, etc. Although
there are some ambiguities around the definition of transparency, it is generally considered
as being essential to the efficient operation of the markets and the development of their
liquidity. All comparability in fact requires the permanent creation/construction of
transparency, i.e. standardised and publicly available information. Yet, paradoxically, what
we are seeing in the marketplace is a concomitant growth in opacity.
Let us recall, albeit briefly, three defining characteristics of the finance industry as it
stands today (Theurillat et al. 2007). Firstly, the increase in capital mobility/liquidity and
the principle of diversification both seem to conspire in favour of the internationalisation of
investments. However, investors are less and less familiar with the new countries in which
investments are made. Furthermore, with the emergence of new sectors, such as real estate
(Theurillat et al. 2006b) or urban infrastructures (Torrance 2006), new skills are needed in
relation to traditional industrial investments Finally, in common with most other business
sectors, the finance industry’s products and services are simultaneously undergoing a
process of both standardisation and innovation/complexification. However, new products
(derivative products, composite products, etc.) are particularly complex and it is impossible
to find the right exit point for any investment.
Conclusions
In conclusion, what can we say about the respective roles of the pension funds and the banks
within contemporary Swiss capitalism? Is real shareholder power emerging? How are the
risks being distributed?
Funds are Rendered Inactive or Captive, Unable to Either Exercise an Exit or Voice a
Strategy on the Domestic Market
For the reasons given above (numerous funds managed by non-professionals with
unsophisticated financial skills, multiplication and dispersal of investments in company
stock, opacity), Swiss pension funds are particularly inactive. Thus, with the exception of a
few large funds, i.e. generally those of big, listed companies and public, cantonal and federal
funds, they are entirely dependent on the country’s main banking and financial companies.
They have neither the time nor the skills to know exactly which companies they hold shares
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in, nor to acquire the relevant information to speak out at AGMs. If they remain passive,
they can, a contrario, no longer exercise their right to exit. Indeed, exit promptly throws one
back into the narrow confines of the Swiss market. This fundamentally affects the power
which Aglietta and Rebérioux (2004) suggest that defection represents. On the Swiss
market, we have not only the drawbacks of small shareholders but also the inability to really
use their exit strategy and move freely in the market.
Moreover, in a financial environment which is essentially made up of the main banks
managing the securities of the second pillar and of the country’s biggest businesses, one
should bear in mind that, in 2002, the country’s 13 largest funds included five funds from the
big listed or unlisted companies (i.e. from UBS, Crédit Suisse, Roche, Novartis and Migros).
Yet these funds prefer not to interfere in the affairs of their parent companies nor of their
competitors, as they are working in a very restricted marketplace. Interviews confirm that
the large public funds have little contact with business management.
In summary, Swiss pension funds are not financial players but financialised players, in
the sense that they clearly constitute a new financial layer but a passive and dependent one.
From a shareholding perspective, they are not in a position to engage in either a voice or an
exit strategy. In terms of their securities’ management, they seem to be dependent upon the
country’s main financial players. In short, the main traditional financial actors remain in a
position to impose their own views and practices.
Banks Remain at the Heart of the System
The industry is currently structured such that the vast majority of Swiss funds are shackled
to the country’s main banks and their asset management departments. The country’s main
banks have therefore not been bypassed by the implementation of market finance and the
creation of the second pillar. Therefore, contrary to the idea of disintermediation (i.e. the
disappearance of traditional financial intermediaries), we are rather witnessing an increase
in functions, services, skills and, sometimes, players. Unlike the traditional banking system,
this reintermediation above all strengthens the country’s two main financial centres in which
pension funds are managed.
The changes to banking revenues reflect this phenomenon. They increasingly derive
from management fees and commissions for securities as well as financial operations
(Schnyder et al. 2006). Securities’ management costs vary between 0.25 and 0.5 per cent of
the total pension funds’ wealth and therefore yield between 1.25 and 2.5bn per annum
(Lusenti 2003: 111–112; Robeco 2002: 125). Conversely, some figures show the extent to
which banking credit is being withdrawn. In the six years between 1997 and 2003, lines of
banking credit aimed at domestic business fell by around 60bn francs, to 302.1bn francs
(Pedergnana & Schacht 2004). This drop has particularly affected SMEs, which take up
86 per cent of the total volume of credit aimed at domestic businesses. It is worth noting
that, although cantonal banks have slightly increased their credit services, the overall drop
in credit can be explained by a marked withdrawal by the large banks.
Moreover, the diversion of savings through pension funds is detrimental to SMEs.
According to Puhr’s calculations (2003), in the year 2000, pension fund investments in
SMEs only represented 1 per cent of second pillar wealth. Moreover the centralisation of
pension fund management has led to a sectorial and spatial change to investments. These
primarily profit the country’s main industrial and financial players, which are based in the
central regions (Theurillat et al. 2007). Investment abroad can be justified by the insufficient
15
absorption capacity of the national economy. Clearly, the strong growth of pension funds
could not be fully absorbed by the Swiss economy without leading to inflation on capital
goods (real estate, equity, etc.) . . . or at least on capital goods that were in one way or
another reachable by the specific channels fuelled by the money of pension funds. Clearly,
SMEs were not connected to the latter. Going through financial markets for investments is
not a neutral process: certain spaces and businesses have been privileged whilst others have
been excluded.
In summary, and purely in terms of the management of institutional assets, traditional
players (the large private and public banks) remain centre stage, with the vast majority of
pension funds looking to them for securities management services. Even when funds mix
these players differently, the fieldwork shows that, paradoxically, the increase in the number
of external mandates does not necessarily lead to a diversification of final investments.
Indeed, the various external managers mostly adopt similar investment plans; this is even
increasingly the case in the Swiss market, as it is highly concentrated, and only offers a few
different possibilities. In brief, most Swiss pension funds are quite ‘blind’ and have no means
and little power or competencies to implement original policy. Only a reform in the structure
of the Swiss pension funds industry could be helpful. Reducing the high number of pension
funds through mergers and the creation of a few large entities could favour some economies
of scale as well as ensure the pooling of competencies. A second step could deal with the
required and mixed competencies that these large entities would need: a few ‘citizen-experts’
that outsource to financial advisers or a ‘representative’ sample of citizens surrounded by
in-house financial experts. . . Various combinations can be imagined.
If the funds do not exercise their rights as active shareholders, who influences decision
making in Switzerland? Who benefits from the dispersal of investments in company stock
and pension fund passivity? Are the banks that manage a significant proportion of pension
funds actually active?
Who is Exercising Shareholder Power in Switzerland?
The great, unresolved issue is that of shareholder power. One might indeed conclude from
this that power resides with a few banks, as there are only a small number of financial insti-
tutions covering the institutional fund management market. Yet it would seem that
depository banks do not generally vote at AGMs (Hofstetter, 2002; Ledentu et al. 2003).
The fact that they specialise in offering services, and that they are also freeing
themselves from internal control (Schnyder et al. 2006), leads one to believe that they do not
necessarily want to invest in external control. Indeed, if a priori, they seem better equipped
than the pension funds to exercise such control, it is only the cost of monitoring which seems
to deter them (Hofstetter 2002).
It is nevertheless interesting to note that there is a market growing up around the
exercise of shareholder votes, i.e. financial institutions (often the very same ones which
manage wealth, such as the private bank Lombard Odier & Darier Hentsch), and often new,
different players (e.g. Ethos), who are offering pension funds a service whereby they analyse
the agendas of companies in which they hold shares and make voting recommendations.
Nevertheless, their hold over and ability to influence big businesses remains, for the time
being, minimal.
If changes in Swiss regulations are systematically tending towards strengthening share-
holders’ rights, ‘shareholder capitalism’ is far from being a reality! On the other hand, a
major change in risk spreading has been noted.
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New Risk Spreading and Industry Developments
If the control and management of pension funds is concentrated in the country’s two
financial centres, risk does not follow the same ‘law’ of spatial concentration. Indeed, the
final capital holders (subscribers) are spread throughout Switzerland. Disintermediation
has allowed banks to divest themselves of risks, but reintermediation by financial players
has not led to a new concentration of risks.
Rather like the emerging market in the exercise of shareholding rights, a consultancy
market is springing up. Moreover, this is mainly composed of independent consultants, to
the detriment of traditional consultants affiliated to banks and insurance companies. They
provide a range of services from actuarial services to reporting on investment results, as well
as selecting and assessing managers (Robeco 2002). In summary, the investment industry is
becoming increasingly complex and the number and scope of skills are expanding as
financial centres become more concentrated. We are dealing with experts in charge of
controlling the experts to whom services are delegated. The finance industry is creating its
own development dynamic! Much like any other industry, finance has seen an increase in
the number of specialist agencies, either within existing organisations or with the creation of
new businesses. The industry has therefore seen a noticeable increase in the number of
players, the division of labour and outsourcing at all levels, and particularly in those areas
where more specialised skills are developing (investment advisors; specific investment funds,
such as hedge funds, emerging markets and international real estate; and fund management
control, etc.). These specialised services are developing in the country’s two financial
centres. This echoes Sassen’s (1991) view that one of the main functions of the global city is
financial innovation.
Investors are becoming sufficiently professional and organised to make their voices
heard, and yet, as the power of these institutional investors increases, are we witnessing the
dawn of a truly democratic shareholding culture, or is this phenomenon, as Lordon (2000)
suggests, simply a mirage? In Switzerland, if we are talking about pension funds, we would
surely say this is a mirage. Looking at its spatial configuration, i.e. the development of a
centralised financial environment which is capable of generating and interpreting data,
providing services, breaking new ground, changing the rules to suit its own ends and of
working across increasingly long distances, we can see all these factors are genuinely a
testament to this apparent trend.
Financial industry governance is carried out to the detriment of funds, as they are
widely dispersed, unprofessional, lack access to useful information, have no influence over
the way the industry works, lack influential business contacts, etc. Given this situation, even
a raft of measures designed to help shareholders could do little to change the situation.
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Notes
1 There exist evidently more models of capitalism (see Crouch 2005 for an overview and a
critical appraisal of the various authors or/and streams of thought using such theoretical
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categorizations). Nevertheless, for questions of space and relevance, we will focus on two models.
Firstly, the Rhenish model, especially considering that Switzerland is generally clearly allied with
this model, even though there are some slight differences. On these similarities and differences
with the Rhenish model, see the work of David et al. (2004). Secondly, the Anglo-Saxon model,
especially considering that most of the reforms undertaken in Switzerland systematically took
their inspiration from this last model.
2 One might make similar observations regarding standard financial theory as applied to corporate
governance, as it is limited to ‘theorising’ an abstract relationship between two players, a
principal (the shareholder) and an agent (the manager).
3 Comparing Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, France, the UK and the USA, Windolf and
Nollert (2001) show that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of shareholders holding 50
per cent or more of share capital was still very high in Switzerland (31.1 per cent). Only Germany
had a higher percentage (51 per cent). Moreover, a high proportion of Swiss multinationals were
still in the hands of one person or a limited number of people. The proportion of large firms
controlled by one individual, or a single family, was very high (31.1 per cent) and even higher than
in Germany (18.9 per cent). In the UK, the situation was different because shareholdings were
much more scattered: over 90 per cent of shareholders held less than 25 per cent of share capital,
a percentage exceeded only by the USA, at 99.9 per cent. In Germany and Switzerland,
shareholders holding less than 25 per cent of share capital were much less numerous – 53.3 and
35.1 per cent, respectively.
4 In Switzerland, the economic recession at the start of the 1990s brought about a series of insti-
tutional reforms called ‘decartelisation’, aimed at increasing competition and strengthening
market mechanisms. These reforms also covered the domestic banking sector, highly cartelised
until then (ASB 1999).
5 Further to the amendment in 2002, the Board of the Foundation has to decide whether the fund
will exercise its right to vote or not. Should this be the case, it will then be required to issue
guidelines which will allow it to define voting positions for each of the points on the AGM agenda
for companies whose funds have shareholders (Robeco 2002:46).
6 The last poll by Lusenti (2003: 65) surveyed 192 respondents, and showed: only 31 per
cent of funds exercise their voting rights in Switzerland; 13 per cent do not vote; 17 per cent
vote at AGMs in Switzerland and abroad. Moreover, following the amendment in 2002
(Article 49, al. 2 OPP2), 45 per cent defined specific regulations, 27 per cent had no specific
regulations, and 3 per cent specified ‘other’. According to a Swissca survey (2004), 40 per cent of
respondents regularly attended AGMs, 32 per cent did not attend, and 27 per cent attended
occasionally.
7 More specifically, this means that the administration as well as wealth management functions are
generally structurally delegated to an insurance company or, less usually, to a bank.
8 In 2002, 62 funds managed over 1bn, and 15 of those over 5bn.
9 In the case of management mandates or direct investments, the funds invest directly in listed
(public or private) companies’ securities (equity or bonds) and investments are managed
individually. Nevertheless, unlike direct real estate investments, direct or individual property
portfolio managers can, theoretically, be carried out either internally or externally, generally in
the form of a management mandate. In the case of collective investments, the wealth from various
investors is pooled in investment funds. Funds thus take up shares within investment foundations,
investment funds or investment companies.
10 Only 23 funds held over a 5 per cent stake in a listed company: 21 have over 5 per cent in any
single business; one in two, and one other in three (figures from SPI, 31 December 2001).
11 On one hand, no survey has been conducted into the specific issue of collective investments and
the problems of shareholder rights; on the other hand, this situation is not covered by Swiss law
(OFAS 2001a).
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